



Telling the Civil Affairs Story A Narrative Strategy for Civil Affairs

1 March 2025

Part I. Introduction – Background, Purpose, Nature, and Scope.

1. Background. This paper explains a Civil Affairs Association initiative to support the Civil Affairs Corps, for which the Association, in consultation with numerous organizations and points of contact, has served as regimental association for many years.¹ At the December 2023 CA Conference at Ft. Liberty, NC, and at the online CA Roundtable in April 2024, the Association led discussion on the growing consensus for a unifying narrative on Civil Affairs. Along with related major deliverables, this paper was tested at the October 2024 Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and presented at the CA Symposium in Philadelphia, PA, in November 2024.

2. Purpose. This paper describes a narrative strategy for the CA Corps to tell its story. It is intended to facilitate development, discussion, and dissemination of a common understanding of CA—more from the bottom up than the top down. It enables the CA Corps to help supported service institutions and commands, and joint, interorganizational, and multinational (JIM) partners understand, leverage, and integrate this uniquely diverse but widely unknown strategic land force to support a complexity of U.S. and allied strategic and politico-military objectives in any given campaign.

3. Nature and Scope. This narrative strategy draws from multiple sources,² including official policy and doctrine. However, it is not an official document. Nor is it comprehensive, exhaustive, or directive. It can be used as a stand-alone source or as a reference that informs organizational or personal deliverables that tell the Civil Affairs story to a multitude of audiences. It can also stimulate and capture the development of narratives from the bottom up as well as the top down. These narratives should be universal to all CA forces in missions at all levels of engagement and integration.

4. Narratives. A narrative galvanizes a community or organization around a shared purpose. It is “an intentionally composed, compelling and inspiring [strategic] *story* that explains the enduring values shared by members of an organization, their origins as a collective, and what they want to achieve in the future—and how.”³ “We don’t tell narratives,” 2024 Roundtable keynote Dr. Ajit Maan explained, “but we do tell stories.”⁴ Rather than reciting talking points of an “elevator speech” or quoting policy and doctrine, the CA community must tell its strategic story around a unifying narrative that is adaptable to thematic context, audience, situation, and deliverer needs.

5. Structure. After this introduction (Part I) is: a narrative strategy for CA (Part II); a narrative framework for telling the CA story (Part III); and narrative development and engagement (Part IV).

6. Points of contact for this project, including the paper and deliverables, are:

a. Col. (Ret.) Dennis J. Cahill, Sr., Director and co-Editor of *The Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, Civil Affairs Association, dennis.j.cahill@gmail.com, 1.910.824.3374.

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Part II. A Narrative Strategy for Civil Affairs.

1. The narrative strategy for Civil Affairs involves the ends, ways, and means by which members of the wider Civil Affairs community, including the extended CA Corps, can tell the Civil Affairs story.

2. Ends. The ends of a Civil Affairs narrative strategy are in education, advocacy, and motivation.

a. *Education* of target audiences on Civil Affairs requires CA professionals to know instinctively how to communicate the capacities, capabilities, and values-added of CA forces along the lines of the narrative framework below. Regardless of service or component, they should be able to explain to any military or civilian interagency audience the comparative advantages and constraints of all CA forces. This helps enable the deployment and employment of the right array of CA forces—leveraged through the request for forces process and optimally integrated in campaign plans and operations. Success is measured in the level of CA representation at supported commands (e.g., plans groups), operational integration of CA forces, and their common identity, interaction, and camaraderie.

b. *Advocacy* goes beyond the educational process. It focuses on institutional and policy leadership levels to address identified DOTMLPF-P* gaps and ensure that CA forces are organized, trained, educated, equipped, and otherwise resourced for deployment and employment across the full range of operations. It ensures that all CA forces receive appropriate program and budgeting prioritization for force development, management, and generation. Audiences include service and joint institutional, Department of Defense (DoD), interagency, and Congressional leadership and staff, as well as the public at large through select mass and social media platforms. Success is measured in terms of CA representation and interaction at these offices, in the presence and activities of champions at these levels, and in the inclusion of CA in the military and national story.

c. *Motivation* results from success in both education and advocacy that generates enthusiasm and interest in Civil Affairs. This is measurable in: the quantity and quality of CA forces; the cultivation of active CA champions among military commands, interagency and interorganizational partners, national command authorities, legislative leadership, and the media; increased Civil Affairs Association membership; and increased participation in Association events and platforms.

3. Ways and Means. The CA narrative strategy incorporates ways and means that support education, advocacy, and motivation. These are in mutually reinforcing and concurrent phases to identify, socialize, adapt, and sustain a CA narrative and facilitate and form this process. These phases include: intellectual capitalization; mainstreaming Civil Affairs; key leader engagement; storytelling; Soldiers and Marines as spokespersons; and building a global-civil-military network.

a. Intellectual Capitalization. This is largely in narrative development and discussion in CA-related collegial platforms like the annual Symposium and Roundtable, the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, *Eunomia Journal*, *OneCA* podcasts, and social media. The Association's Publication Advisory Board is another source for CA personnel to write academic and staff papers and articles in professional journals and open publications. It also supports CA book projects such as *Warrior-Diplomats*.⁵

* Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.

b. Mainstreaming Civil Affairs. Development and discussion of the CA narrative is not exclusive to CA-specific platforms. Mainstreaming and integrating CA into larger discussions at service and joint levels helps educate those forces on CA and ensures its inclusion in larger force, doctrinal, and policy development up to and including the interagency level. It also helps advocate CA to audiences external to the CA community with critical impact on the growth, success, and viability of CA. This includes publishing articles in professional military journals, greater coverage of CA in mass and social media, and appearing with CA deliverables at events such as the AUSA Annual meeting.

c. Key Leader Engagement. Finding and developing champions of impact is an implied task for every CA professional regardless of component, mission, and level of engagement. At institutional levels, the Association must mindfully invite key military and civilian leadership as event speakers or to appear in *OneCA* podcasts to explain how CA fits their command or institutional vision.

d. Storytelling. Likewise, every CA professional at every level of command and integration should take every opportunity to tell the Civil Affairs story to educate, advocate, and motivate. This is based not only on the narrative framework below, but on historical sources, current literature, CA best practices, and personal experiences as well as policy and doctrine. In addition to this paper, the Association has developed a briefing and handout as deliverables to leverage and adapt as desired and appropriate. Stories can also appear in papers, articles, podcast appearances, and social media.

e. Soldiers and Marines as Spokespersons. Former USAJFKSWCS commanding general, Maj. Gen. Kurt Sonntag, urged the CA Corps to tell its story aggressively and widely—beyond the usual forums and including political and public audiences—to recruit members as well as supporters. “As members of the CA force, both past and present, no one is better able to tell our story not only to our leaders and decision makers but more and more to the young Soldiers currently serving as well as young men and women in your communities who have yet to make the decision to serve.”⁶

f. Building a Global Civil-Military Network. A global civil-military network helps build a capacity critical to CA force success in contemporary and emerging environments, as discussed in the 8th volume of the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*.⁷ It widens audiences to educate, advocate, and motivate and for socializing the CA narrative. Beyond JIM levels, this includes academia, private industry, and partner civil affairs and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) organizations.

Part III. A Narrative Framework for Telling the Civil Affairs Story.

1. The unifying (strategic) narrative for telling the Civil Affairs story is framed in response to basic questions identified at the 2023 Civil Affairs Conference and 2024 Civil Affairs Roundtable. These include: What is Civil Affairs? What do Civil Affairs forces do? Why is Civil Affairs important? and, What is the way forward for Civil Affairs?

2. What Is Civil Affairs?

a. Civil Affairs is the unique DoD multicomponent capability and joint strategic land power force that actively helps military commanders at all levels of engagement see, understand, engage, and influence the human dimension of conflict in all operational domains to “secure the victory” and achieve U.S. and allied political and military objectives—before, during, and after armed conflict.

b. DoD CA forces reside in the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Active U.S. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) CA units are assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These operate in deep areas and where access may be difficult. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) conventional CA units, in turn, are largely assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). They support maneuver units in close and rear areas and provide government/functional specialist expertise to military commands, civilian partner organizations, and host nation authorities. U.S. Marine Corps active civil-military operations (CMO) officers and reserve component tactical CA detachments support Fleet Marine and Navy task forces. Over 80% of more than 11,000 U.S. CA personnel is in the reserve component. Demand for CA often exceeds its deployable capacity.

c. CA draws its identity and characteristics from a storied history of population engagement going back to the Lewis and Clark expedition. Its main role as the premier military capability for civil-military integration, stabilization, and the consolidation of military and security gains into civilian and political outcomes is deeply rooted in military government and post-conflict stabilization in the wars with Mexico and Spain, World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and in Iraq and Afghanistan—transitioning from war to peace and from military to civilian control.

3. What Do Civil Affairs Forces Do?

a. CA forces enable mission command; increase strategic, operational, and tactical situational awareness, understanding, and influence; preserve combat power; consolidate military and security gains into civilian and political outcomes; and enable a secure and stable environment consistent with U.S. interests. They also help fulfill U.S. military command responsibilities to protect civilians under U.S. and international law, minimize civilian interference with military operations, and mitigate unintended harmful effects of military operations on civilian populations and institutions.

b. CA forces plan, coordinate, execute, and assess actions “to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.”⁸

c. According to U.S. Army Civil Affairs Operations doctrine, CA missions include:

- Conduct civil reconnaissance (CR).
- Conduct civil engagement (CE).
- Conduct civil network development (CND).
- Conduct civil knowledge integration (CKI).
- Establish civil-military operations centers (CMOCs).
- Provide support to civil administration (SCA).
- Establish and maintain transitional military authority.

d. In addition to advising commanders in these missions, CA forces coordinate with other U.S. departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, international organizations and agencies, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, non-governmental and civil society organizations, key societal, economic, and political leaders, and commercial entities and actors.

e. CA supports civilian-led stability operations, including civil security, governance, essential public services, and economic and infrastructure recovery and development. It helps establish civil population control in conflict areas and, when directed, assists or conducts humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a last resort. It may also perform civilian sector functions normally the responsibility of civil authorities or establish military government to restore those authorities.

f. At all levels of planning and execution, CA forces apply enduring principles of CA operations:⁹

- Military operations must deter or defeat asymmetric and irregular threats from the civil environment, including terrorism, sabotage, and other illicit network activities.
- Military forces must protect civilian populations from the harmful effects of conflict in accordance with the laws of land warfare and international human rights law.
- Military operations can cause direct or indirect adverse impacts on the civilian environment even if not in the vicinity of populated areas.
- Military forces must help communities affected by military operations return to normalcy, in accordance with international laws and norms.
- Civilians can be sources of civil information, capabilities, and resources of relevance or support to military operations.
- Meaningful civil-military engagement with civilian sources of information, resources, and capabilities requires military personnel with proper preparation and training.
- Employ local solutions to local problems using local resources as much as possible.
- The integration of civilian partners into military plans and operations (or, conversely, military capabilities into civilian plans and operations) requires proper preparation and training.
- CA Soldiers and Marines are the force of choice for civil-military engagement, civil-military integration, and military support to governance in stabilization across the competition continuum.

g. While critical to Army and Marine Corps tactical operations, CA forces are best leveraged and integrated at theater strategic and operational levels in multicomponent, JIM-oriented teams through geographic combatant and service component commands and interorganizational partners. CA forces are well suited to play an integral role in strategic and operational campaigning in the JIM environment in support of integrated deterrence across the full range of operations.

h. A cost-effective, non-escalatory capability with unique military access to numerous civilian contacts, CA acts as regionally and culturally aligned global scouts and enablers to “secure the victory” through positional and informational advantages in strategic competition, synchronized with diplomacy and development efforts and the Army National Guard State Partnership Program.

i. CA functional specialists, in particular, help political-military leadership identify, understand, engage, and influence the strategic and operational environment, including people-centric centers of gravity and related civil threats critical to winning in cross-continuum multi-domain operations. Army 38G Military Government Specialists can also determine the linkages between campaign objectives, threats, and cross-cutting variables like stable governance and civilian resilience, the rule of law system, a safe and secure civil environment, a sustainable economy, and social well-being.

4. Why Is Civil Affairs Important?

a. Civil Affairs provides a unique national capability to win, end, and prevent wars. The CA force is an economy-of-force capability critical to the ability of the Army, as a strategic land force, in the fulfillment of the Army's strategic roles (below). As the joint CA proponent has phrased it: "Its value lies in its inimitable ability to provide comprehensive and actionable knowledge of governance and the drivers of instability within the civil populace, validate and integrate civil considerations into the operations process, and leverage civilian capabilities and resources to mitigate political, economic, and social challenges inherent to operations across the competition continuum."¹⁰

b. As a maneuver force in the psycho-cultural spaces of war and peace and the gray zones between them, CA plays a key role in gaining, maintaining, and denying positional and informational advantages among human networks in what NATO calls "cognitive warfare."

c. Civil Affairs is the premier U.S. military capability for interagency stabilization and conflict prevention—i.e., for "winning without fighting." It is also the main force for operational civil-military integration in stabilization along JIM lines. CA contributes decisively to full-range positional and information advantages by building civil-military networks through CR, CE, and CKI.

d. With a *modus operandi* of thinking strategically while acting tactically, these "warrior-diplomats" are organized, trained, and resourced to coordinate and network with interagency, interorganizational, international, and local contacts. As a result, CA promotes a larger and better learning organization in all four Army strategic roles (shape operational environments; counter aggression on land during crisis; prevail during large-scale ground combat operations (LSCO); and consolidate gains)¹¹ in concurrently irregular and conventional settings. This improves the agility of the joint force to "secure the victory" and win without fighting in conflict prevention and integrated deterrence across the entire competition continuum, including setting conditions in the civil environment and creating information and influence positional advantages to prevail in LSCO.

e. Along with maintaining leverageable relationships with its partners in diplomacy (U.S. State Department) and development (U.S. Agency for International Development), CA is the premier military force to strengthen alliances and attract new partners that constitute our most vital strategic advantage over great power adversaries. This includes ongoing relations with NATO CIMIC forces and other professional counterparts. In addition to helping gain and maintain access and influence where other U.S. forces or even some of its own partners cannot, CA helps commanders and statespersons gather critical insights on populations of concern that could help mold strategy and policy. Integrated deterrence, after all, finds much of its positional and informational advantages in the global civil-military network that CA helps gain and maintain through the interallied and interorganizational systems among the world's leading democracies.

f. As of late, the increasing forward presence of CA—as global and regional scouts and enablers for intrinsically expeditionary U.S. forces—increases situational understanding and influence, provides early warning, and facilitates superior politico-military decision-making cycles through continuous civil reconnaissance, engagement, and networking activities. This helps mitigate the inherent U.S. military disadvantage of being the "visiting team" in operations overseas.

5. What Is the Way Forward for Civil Affairs?

a. Colonel Irwin Hunt's seminal postwar analysis on Civil Affairs and military governance in 1918 evokes many issues CA faces today. There is still much unfinished business in maturing CA into a full-fledged member of the military family. The CA Corps lacks unity of command for force management. There is still no standing CA staff section at the Joint Staff or Army Headquarters, nor are there consistently staffed organic CA staff or plans capabilities at all major geographic, service, operational, or tactical commands, which are still trying to access reserve CA forces with outmoded Title 10 budget authorities designed for contingency rather than continuous operations.

b. Albeit changing, CA is often viewed mainly as a "force multiplier," "enabler," or combat support element rather than as a maneuver force in the human dimension and information environment. To realize its full potential, CA must be organized, managed, resourced, and integrated as seriously as combat forces—and operationalizing this requires institutionalizing it. This includes integration with other information-related and select Compo 2 forces. If CA and other information-related capabilities are not optimally structured to integrate physical and informational power in multi-domain operations and integrated deterrence, then neither is the Army, joint force, or Nation.

c. To "secure the victory" across the board, CA must be better educated and trained within and beyond standard military programs. This requires steady and robust investment in the human capital of an innovative and adaptive force well embedded in planning and operations—at national commands and institutions and geographic combatant, service, and other campaigning commands.

d. CA forces must also be persistently engaged and aligned regionally to facilitate political-military goals and objectives—globally networked with interagency, multinational, academic, and private industry institutions, forming their own socio-academic-industrial base. This includes the careful integration of commercial artificial intelligence and machine-learning.

e. This imperative also requires a universally active sense of real-time CA readiness for strategic competition that only a constant forward regional presence of all CA force types can engender, including reserve CA forces and functional specialists. Local relationships and context in the competition continuum matter deeply to winning in contemporary warfare.

f. To leverage the strength of the diversity of an extended CA Corps of Army and Marine, active and reserve, conventional and special operations, and general support and functional specialist personnel, geographic and service commands and U.S. embassy teams should continue to employ more and more task-organized, multicomponent CA teams along JIM lines to meet complex and dynamic security cooperation and other integrated deterrence requirements.

g. In the 21st century, "strategic advantage will emerge from how we engage with and understand people and access political, economic, and social networks to achieve a position of relative advantage that complements American military strength." As such, the actor that best understands local contexts and builds a network around relationships that harness local capacities is likely to win. Across the competition continuum, the U.S. must be constantly ready to gain and maintain decisive strategic advantage because "in this connected world, even more than before, the decisive battle will occur before the first shot is fired."¹²

Part IV. Narrative Development and Engagement.

1. At the 2024 Roundtable, Dr. Maan suggested that developing a CA narrative requires three elements: a solid understanding of ourselves (origins, principles, challenges, and goals for the future); identification of the target audience and its cultural narrative; and delivery of our story in a way that resonates with the target audience based on its cultural narrative. We also must know how the audience views CA in relationship to the audience’s mission and capabilities. Ultimately, the CA story should be told in a way that “fits into the cognitive scheme of the target audience.”¹³

2. Part III of this paper addressed the first element, providing an outline of what CA should know about itself and what it wishes to achieve as it engages key audiences. The following paragraphs address the second element, providing notional cultural narratives of three sample priority target audiences with whom CA professionals typically engage. These narratives exemplify the results of a target audience analysis conducted prior to engagement to understand how the members of that audience see themselves and how they view CA. By preparing this way, CA spokesperson(s) can successfully execute the third element, framing and delivering the CA story to resonate and assure the audience that, when properly prioritized and resourced, CA provides the capacities and capabilities to meet operational and strategic requirements.

a. **Strategic and operational military decision-makers at the Pentagon, GCCs, and Service component commands:** Decision-makers at strategic- and operational-level commands advance U.S. civil-military priorities through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring positional and informational advantages. They allocate resources and employ capabilities to defend the homeland; deter strategic attacks against the United States, its allies, and its partners; deter aggression; prevail in conflict when necessary; and build a resilient joint force and defense ecosystem to ensure our future military advantage.¹⁴ They see CA as a military capability to support joint force campaigns and operations that protect and advance U.S. national security interests across the full spectrum and in all warfighting domains. In stabilization, they see CA forces as strictly supporting civilian authorities and other U.S. government agencies that lead civilian governance activities, civil sector functions, rehabilitation efforts, and humanitarian and other forms of assistance.¹⁵ That said, the joint force often does not employ sufficient or timely CA forces in campaigning to leverage their capabilities to their fullest potential.

b. **Tactical-level joint force commanders and staffs:** As a vital component of integrated deterrence and campaigning, tactical-level joint forces employ capabilities against threats by planning and executing battles and engagements to achieve military objectives. To do this, they remain ready and relevant, conducting operations to secure positional or informational advantages across the competition continuum and exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. They recognize and work with third-party entities and organizations that operate in the same or adjacent areas of operation and may also affect achievement of these objectives—particularly in the areas of civilian harm mitigation and response. These include civilian populations, host nation (HN) governments, political groups, international organizations, NGOs, and contractors.¹⁶

Tactical-level forces also recognize the role of attached CA forces in helping commanders make timely and appropriate decisions on the protection of civilians based on ground conditions. However, in higher headquarters analyses of operational and mission variables,¹⁷ factors such as political limitations on troop numbers, relative combat power between friendly and enemy forces, and expected tempo of combat operations often result in the deployment of insufficient CA forces in the early stages of operations. Tactical-level commanders mitigate resulting risks by tasking combat and sustainment forces to address civil considerations as secondary missions and delaying civilian-focused stabilization activities until sufficient CA forces arrive. They prefer, however, to have access to the right CA capabilities at the right time and place to relieve organic combat and sustainment forces of missions better suited for CA forces.

c. **U.S. government civilian partner departments and agencies:** U.S. civilian partners must work successfully with allies and partners in pursuit of a free, open, prosperous, and secure global order. To that end, they persistently engage counterparts in allied and partner nations and governments to promote stable environments in which to advance U.S. national interests: to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.¹⁸ U.S. civilian partners recognize and acknowledge the military focus on security threats and the fact that military operations are often necessary to defeat our enemies and re-establish order during and after armed conflict or other crises. However, U.S. civilian partners often observe that, once assigned to a designated area of operation, military leaders at the operational and tactical levels tend to ignore or discount their organizations' full-range plans, achievements, and capabilities in that area. Seasoned members of the civilian partner organization may recognize the civil-military integration function of CA professionals, but every mission is different and less experienced civilian partners may not know they have allies and advocates in the CA force.

3. Given how narratives evolve from the bottom up more than the top down, CA professionals must play a crucial role in refining and adapting the CA story as much as telling it. Following important engagements with key audiences, CA professionals should conduct internal after-action reviews to improve target audience analysis as well as engagement effectiveness. If they identify a lesson of value to the CA Corps at large, they should share their insights on open forums and convening events such as the CA Symposium and CA Roundtable, communication platforms such as the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, *Eunomia Journal*, and *OneCA* podcast, and Association and linked social media sites, as appropriate. They should consider mainstreaming their thoughts through professional military journals or other media, with which the Publication Advisory Board can assist.

Endnotes.

¹ The Association represents and consults regularly with the 95th CA Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne), representing active Army special operations CA forces; the U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), representing U.S. Army Reserve conventional CA forces and Army special functionalists; the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), representing the Army CA proponent; the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Force Modernization Center's CA Capability Manager, representing the Army CA proponent; the U.S. Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS), representing the USMC CA proponent; the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) J-39, representing the joint CA proponent; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)), representing CA interagency executive authority.

² Sources for this document include:

- Kurt N. Sisk and Dennis J. Cahill, "Civil Affairs Value Proposition," AOFM-CA Information Paper (unpublished), 23 March 2022.
- The Civil Affairs Association, *Civil Affairs Issue Papers, 2013-2024*, <https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/ca-issue-papers-reports>.
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Civil Affairs*, DoD Directive 2000.13 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), Incorporating Change 1, 15 May 2017 (currently under revision as DoD Instruction 3000.LX, *Civil-Military Operations, Activities, and Investments*).
- President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2022).
- U.S. Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022).
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Stabilization*, DoD Directive 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).
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- Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense, *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018).
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil-Military Operations*, JP 3-57 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
- U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2022).
- U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-57 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021).
- U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, FM 3-05.401/MCRP 3-33.1A (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003).
- U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-23A.2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013).
- U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Network Development and Engagement*, ATP 3-57.30 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2023).
- General conversations by the authors within and among CA professionals at Civil Affairs Association events and informal engagements over the past 20 years.

³ Amy Zalman, "What is a strategic narrative?" AmyZalman.com, 5 February 2022; <https://amyzalman.com/what-is-a-strategic-narrative-strategic-narrative-faqs/>

⁴ See Christopher Holshek and Dennis J. Cahill, "Roundtable Concludes Productive Year of Looking at 'Campaigning and Civil Affairs,'" *2024 Civil Affairs Roundtable Report*, The Civil Affairs Association,

⁵ Arnel David, Sean Acosta, and Nicholas Krohley. *Warrior Diplomats: Civil Affairs Forces on the Front Lines* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2023).

⁶ Maj. Gen. Kurt Sonntag, Commanding General, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School in Christopher (ed.), "Executive Summary," *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* (Vol. 4), 2017-18, The Civil Affairs Association, xix-xx.

⁷ Christopher Holshek (ed.), *Building a Global Civil-Military Network*, Civil Affairs Issue Papers (Vol. 8), 2021-22, The Civil Affairs Association, 2022.

⁸ FM 3-57, 2-1.

⁹ These principles are not currently found in any single document. They were drawn from several of the sources of inspiration listed in Note 2 and distilled by the points of contact listed in paragraph 5.

¹⁰ Kurt N. Sisk and Dennis J. Cahill, "Civil Affairs Value Proposition," AOFM-CA Information Paper (unpublished), 23 March 2022, 1.

¹¹ FM 3-0, 1-1.

¹² Both quotes in this paragraph are from Charles Cleveland, Benjamin Jensen, Susan Bryant and Arnel David, *Military Strategy in the 21st Century: People, Connectivity, and Competition* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2018), 4.

¹³ Dr. Ajiit Maan's Keynote Presentation at CA Roundtable, 18 Apr 2024. See also *2024 Civil Affairs Roundtable Report*.

¹⁴ *NDS*, 27 October 2022, 1.

¹⁵ DRAFT DoDD 3000.LX, *Civil Affairs*, 8 Sep 2023, paragraphs 1.3.b. and 1.3.d. (to be validated and rewritten, if necessary, once final version is published.)

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), xvi, I-3, I-11. and III-47.

¹⁷ As outlined in Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, planners analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations,) represents the mission variables leaders use to analyze and understand a situation in relationship to the unit's mission.

¹⁸ *NSS*, 7.