Interim Report

on the

2022 Civil Affairs Symposium

“Civil Affairs: A Force for Winning without Fighting”

The Civil Affairs Association

in coordination with the

Association of the United States Army
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Joint Special Operations University
Modern War Institute – Irregular Warfare Initiative
NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence

and

Joint Civil-Military Interaction

and with the sponsorship of

The Patriot Fund
Third Order Effects
Civil Solutions International
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and

Conducttr

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The Civil Affairs Association hosted its annual web-based Symposium, sponsored by The Patriot Fund, Third Order Effects, Civil Solutions International, Valka Mir Human Security, and Conducttr, from 14-15 November 2022. The event, involving nearly 300 participants, was in coordination with the Association of the United States Army, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Joint Special Operations University, the Modern War Institute’s Irregular Warfare Initiative, and NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence.

Last year’s Symposium concluded that, whether for large-scale combat operations, irregular warfare, or great power competition, advantage goes to those who consistently amass a superior learning network. Institutionally as well as operationally, this comes from a continual process of building civil-military networks that strengthen alliances and attract new partners. The war in Ukraine and heightened competition with China and Russia across the regions have affirmed not only the criticality of gaining, maintaining, and leveraging such human networks but also how that improves understanding and integrating civil considerations and contextual understanding.

As the U.S. military shifts away from conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has begun focusing on its “pacing challenge” with China. “That challenge isn’t purely combat-oriented,” observed 1st U.S. Corps commander Lt. Gen. Xavier T. Brunson. The goal is to provide engagement with U.S. allies and partners in the region to prevent potential crises from escalating into conflicts. Those crises are often humanitarian and diplomatic in nature, requiring other forms of power that are supported by and coordinated with military power.

Given new national security and defense strategies, Army operations doctrine, the designation of CA as an “information force,” and NATO concepts such as “cognitive warfare,” how should the expanded Civil Affairs Corps integrate institutionally with supported military commands and civilian agencies to become a better force to win without fighting? What changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy should take place within and beyond current capacities? How should they be prioritized and implemented? What levels of joint, interorganizational, multinational, and commercial coordination are needed?

These were among the questions this year’s Symposium’s speakers, workshops, and Civil Affairs Issue Papers presentations explored to enable the CA Corps to offer ways ahead to related institutional and policy leadership.
Major Findings

Although not all the answers the Symposium explored were comprehensive or conclusive, the participants did identify some interesting findings of relevance to CA force development:

- Beyond the traditional military-centric understanding of deterrence, integrated deterrence, introduced in the new National Security Strategy, is much more than being able to defeat adversaries more quickly and decisively or even consolidating and shaping a more favorable post-conflict environment. Integrated deterrence is about winning without fighting. In conflict prevention, across domains, across regions, across the spectrum of conflict, and among U.S. agencies as well as with allies and interorganizational partners—gaining, maintaining, and denying political and informational positional advantages that obviate the use of force and ensure its success, must force be wielded.

- Civil affairs is the de facto joint force of choice to win without fighting by supporting and implementing integrated deterrence not just to “secure the victory” before, during, and after major combat but also in preventing it in the first place. More Army leaders are coming to realize that “secure the victory” does not apply solely to post-conflict situations.

- As the premier civil-military and information force in the human dimension of integrated deterrence, CA forces facilitate civil-military situational understanding, strategic early warning, and superior politico-military decision-making through continuous civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil networking, and knowledge integration. Per a 2022 CA Capability Manager information paper, CA’s main value lies in its “inimitable ability to provide comprehensive and actionable knowledge of governance and the drivers of instability within the civil populace, validate and integrate civil considerations into the operations process, and leverage civilian capabilities and resources to mitigate political, economic, and social challenges inherent to operations across the competition continuum.”

- As the Capability Manager also briefed at the Annual Meeting, CA forces provide “a fully trained, organized, and missioned capability to detect, disrupt, and defeat threats within the physical, human, and information dimensions of the civil component; gain information advantage; conduct actions to consolidate gains; enable or provide civil governance; preserve combat power; maintain operational tempo; and conduct special operations.”

- To do this requires a military institutional understanding of capabilities like CA as maneuver forces in the psycho-cultural spaces of war and integrated deterrence. Much more than mere “force multipliers” or “enablers,” the Association has contended, these warrior-diplomats must be organized, managed, resourced, and integrated with the same institutional and operational seriousness as combat forces.

- This also requires a universally active sense of CA readiness for strategic competition that only a constant forward regional presence of all CA force types provide. Integrated deterrence finds greatest positional advantage in the global civil-military network gained and maintained through the interallied and interorganizational system among the world’s leading democracies. It is enabling the U.S. and NATO, for example, to play a decisive stand-off role in thwarting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and countering Chinese regional strategy.
• To improve or expand the inherent capacities and capabilities of CA forces and maintain readiness for multicomponent civil-military transitions, regional commands must more than include sufficient CA forces in deliberate contingency planning and have them ready and available for early entry. They must employ sufficient active and reserve component CA forces in persistent engagement and security cooperation to develop enduring relationships that shape and build the decisive positional advantages of a robust global civil-military network, provide civilian and military senior leadership with increased options and flexibility, and (as necessary) set favorable conditions in conflict and post-conflict. Exercises, including wargaming and experimentation, are a cost-effective way to program and integrate a more robust and persistent presence of multicomponent CA forces in regions and in integration with interorganizational partners.

• Strategic employment of Army 38G government specialists is illustrative of the way to employ contemporary CA capabilities to shape the competition environment and “secure the victory” well before armed conflict. In addition to creating access, influence, and other positional advantage capacities through the networks they help build side-by-side with conventional and SOF CA Soldiers, 38Gs deepen the understanding of political, economic, social, and cultural factors whose security implications are more critical in strategic competition—as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. To be most effective, however, 38G officers must be as adept at communicating and operationalizing stability sector expertise with military commands as in communicating and collaborating with civilian partners.

• A more robust, standardized CA core curriculum helps level the inconsistencies in CA capacities across components that forward presence and talent may not. This makes the CA Corps more interoperable and interchangeable across components and a more consistently reliable capability for supported commands. There are also many distance and online resources such as from the Army University Press, Combined Arms Center, and other professional military education (PME) and non-PME education and training resources listed on the Association website. Another opportunity for reserve CA professionals is the Army’s U.S. Military Observer Group discussed below and at the last Roundtable.

• The Association’s intellectual capitalization platforms, like the Symposium, Roundtable, Issue Papers, OneCA podcast, Eunomia Journal, etc., provide unique opportunity to deepen collective understanding of CA force development challenges. This understanding moves CA force development forward faster and more comprehensively to keep pace with threats, and deepen, as well as widen, a worldwide civil-military learning organization through flank coordination with civil-military allies and interorganizational partners.

• As Lt. Gen. Brunson said at the Annual Meeting (and as retired Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley tendered at the 2021 Roundtable), greater CA presence among Army and joint commands can help them better understand how to win without fighting through civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and knowledge integration in strategic competition and integrated deterrence. This mitigates an overemphasis on major combat operations and great power competition with Russia and China (in response to failures in Afghanistan and Iraq), and corrects insufficient understanding of allies and interorganizational partners.
Nowhere was “winning without fighting”—the theme for the Symposium and the 2022-23 Civil Affairs Issue Papers—more concisely argued than with keynote speaker Brig. Gen. “Will” Guillaume Beaurpere’s argument that it “is central to the concept of integrated deterrence as presented in our National Defense Strategy.” The Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) explained that the “sheer scale of destructive power and the devastation to the global order that could result from a large-scale conflict with our strategic adversary should urge all of us to drive ruthlessly toward ‘winning without fighting’ – or, put another way, to achieve victory before war.”

Beaurpere confided that this year’s theme “will generate the critical dialogue and unique ideas we need to deliver Civil Affairs to the Army and the joint force... We have a unique opportunity over the next few days of this Symposium to consider this concept through the lens of our Civil Affairs capability and capacity.” As the USAJFKSWCS Commander, his priority is to “deliver the doctrine, training, leader development, and personnel solutions for a range of irregular warfare capabilities that are ready and capable to support both the Army and the Joint Force of 2030.” To address the issue of how to shape the CA force of 2030 to contribute to integrated deterrence, he focused on three CA force development areas: multi-component training equity and alignment; development of the Army’s 38G capability; and modernization of the active component training pathway.

"We should not be comfortable with 2030 as our time horizon,” he stated. Considering the “pacing threat” of China, CA must respond to 2030 challenges as soon as 2027. “We may even see roles for our CA forces before then in post-conflict Ukraine or across a range of other crises around the globe.” This means that CA soldiers signing up today could very well face a crisis or conflict during their first tour of duty. “To drive and implement change to our CA training pathway, we must visualize and describe the CA soldier in MDO [multi-domain operations], ruthlessly test and validate his capabilities in training and experimentation, and continually draw from this and ongoing conflicts to evolve our training and leader development strategies,” he submitted.

Regardless of component, CA forces must constantly focus on civil-military transitions along the competition continuum. Much CA capacity and capability develops during strategic competition through deliberate engagement with host nations to understand civil governance structures and systems. When crisis and conflict emerge, the CA Corps draws from this depth of knowledge to advise commanders and set the conditions—simultaneously in the deep, close, and rear areas—for post-conflict transition back to functioning host-nation governance systems, transition of enemy-controlled territory to friendly forces, and transition to sustainable stability.

An example of this was Operation Inherent Resolve. As the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), enabled by small teams of SOF advisors, reclaimed ISIS-controlled terrain, CA team leaders found themselves de facto mayors for large cities like Raqqah, administering governance functions while working to re-establish SDF control and stability in Northeast Syria. Leveraging small CA teams along with other SOF in the periphery enabled the CJTF to focus on its main effort in liberating
large swaths of territory in neighboring Iraq. Among the many lessons being incorporated into CA doctrine and training is how the CA force must prepare for the possibility that indigenous partners will seize enemy-controlled terrain and begin similar localized transitions.

“As I visualize this 2030 battlefield, SOF Civil Affairs forces would have the charge of developing, engaging, and leveraging civil networks in the deep area to identify key governance systems and infrastructure to be preserved as the joint force advances against the enemy. This would include key individuals and organizations that would enable the rapid reconstitution of host nation governance and stabilization while maintaining economy of force,” he pointed out.

With respect to reserve training equity and alignment, Brig. Gen. Beaurpere admitted that “the initial training qualification pathway is not sufficient to ensure the transition of CA responsibilities from the close area to the rear area,” a risk to mission requires training and leader development programs to address. The idea of “exceptional officers with unique civilian skills in the reserve component” consistently throughout the whole of the reserve force is not realistic. “There are highly talented individuals in the reserve component who, by benefit of unique experiences in their full-time civilian career, or just sheer natural aptitude, can easily handle anything the future environment may throw at them. However, we cannot build a capability around the idea, or hope, of having such exceptional individuals in every place we will need them.”

To ensure a sufficiently trained corps of reserve CA personnel for the environments described above, the reserve officer qualification course must expand to match the length of the active component Phase I course. A similar disparity exists between enlisted reserve military occupational specialty (MOS) transfers into CA, necessitating a similar expansion for that population. This will require a commitment of resources, but it would also simplify training requirements across components and lend itself for better interoperability between CA elements dispersed across the joint force operational framework. While it does not mean sending reservists through the full active component pathway, “that idea is not off the table entirely.”

Alignment and rebalancing active and reserve components to address the many current unfilled requisitions for SOF in the global force management system and the future demands for SOF CA and PSYOP in the potential large-scale conflicts of 2030 and beyond is also a serious consideration. Within that, aligning force structure to COMPO 2 (National Guard) CA in certain states that have the resources to adequately man, train, and equip such units and ample opportunities for CA Soldiers to practice their skills in real-world humanitarian disaster situations. “The analysis is ongoing and I hope this forum generates useful ideas to propel them forward. Given what we know and anticipate, a highly capable conventional CA force is critical for the 2030 fight.”

Brig. Gen. Beaurpere reported that the 38G CA functional specialist program, approved in 2013 and with its first in-service transfers in 2015, has surged following the CA Proponent’s Force Modernization Assessment, or FMA, conducted from 2019 to 2020. The first direct commissioned candidate into the 38G program was last December, with 89 more direct commission candidates as the training pathway is finalized and codified. “A robust corps of experts across the various
domains of governance is within reach, and we will continue to pursue this critical capability and I
would challenge this group to think about other gaps that could be filled with such a program. (For
a deeper dive into the 38G functional specialist program, which has grown by nearly 1,000% since
2019, see the Association Annual Meeting Report pm the presentation by Col. Scott DeJesse, U.S.
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) Cultural Programs Officer.)

The active component training pathway modernization is another initiative spurred forward by
the CA Force Modernization Assessment and an essential component of building the CA force of
2030. The most significant change from the previous CA qualification course is the
acknowledgement of and specific training and education on governance. The CA Proponent is
drafting the Transitional Governance ATP in coordination with the 3rd Training Battalion, 1st
Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), which is developing specific modules on Governance
in Phases I and II of the active pathway as well as incorporating governance problems and
scenarios in the Operation Sluss-Tiller Culmination Exercise to validate individual governance
understanding and competence.

“Active component SOF CA forces must understand governance systems to set the conditions for
successful re-establishment of effective host nation governance systems post-conflict,” he
stressed, “but we should not be satisfied with only addressing governance without taking into
account information advantage implications on the future CA mission. We have successfully
implemented a Synthetic Internet Training Environment in our PSYOP culmination exercise and
should expand this to CA exercises to build inherently digital native Soldiers that can extend their
understanding and influence into the information dimension. There are likely other initiatives we
can build on here and I welcome your thoughts to continuously refine our training.”

Brig. Gen. Beaupere concluded by admitting that the picture of what CA Forces must be prepared
to do in the future is not a complete picture. “We need all of your help to better understand and
define what will be required of the force for 2030. To be frank, we won't fully know what the
environment of 2030 will demand until 2030. The history of futurology indicates that this is all but
certain to be the case. With that in mind, however, we must rigorously explore the possibilities
and develop so that we may be prepared to adjust to the future reality from a position of strength.”

While he discussed some of the avenues to prepare for this uncertain future, he did not think these
measures alone are enough. “We are looking for more innovative ways to shape a CA force that
can enable the MDO fight and ensure the successful consolidation of gains and post-conflict
stabilization,” he elicited his audience. “To deter the calamity of a great power conflict, we must be
prepared to credibly excel in every phase of that conflict... With that, I implore you all to take the
opportunity these two days afford to deepen our collective understanding of the future fight; to
widen our aperture of the means to improve our posture; and to move forward from this event
with actionable solutions to get us where we need to be. Challenge yourselves and each other to
meet the urgent demands the Nation has placed upon us.”
Workshop I – Civil Affairs in Joint, Army, Marine Corps, and NATO Initiatives

Fittingly, Workshop I, which featured representatives from the institutional proponents for U.S. Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence (CCoE), followed Brig. Gen. Beaurpere’s keynote speech. The panel provided updates on initiatives that help build CA and CIMIC forces capable of working with others to win without fighting.

This recurring panel was facilitated by Col. (Ret.) Dennis J. Cahill, Deputy Civil Affairs Capability Manager at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Force Modernization Center (UFMC) and a member of the CA Association Board of Directors. Since the representatives from the Joint Civil Affairs Proponent (Lt. Col. Micah Baker) and the Army Civil Affairs Capability Manager (Col. Kurt Sisk) were unable to attend, Col. (Ret.) Cahill presented in their absence.

For the Joint CA Proponent, Col. (Ret) Cahill reported the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) J39 was updating the 23 Jan 2018 USSOCOM Directive 525-38, Civil Military Engagement (CME). The Directive provides definitions, concepts, and guidance and assigns responsibilities for the support and conduct of the USSOCOM CME Program of Record. According to the directive, CME is “persistent engagement conducted by USSOCOM assigned civil affairs by, with, and through unified action partners (UAP) to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) within the operational environment (OE) in support of Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Campaign Plans, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Campaign Support Plan, and in conjunction with U.S. Embassy (USEMB) strategies.” It goes on to say: “The CME program increases the capability of U.S. Government (USG) supported IPI, reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries, and leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE in support of...” theater and country plans and strategies. At any time, 30–40 Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSEs) may be operational in as many countries across the globe, with a presence in every theater, except for NORTHCOM. By all accounts, the CME program offers a great return on investment in those theaters and countries when it comes to working with our partners to counter malign influence during competition – a very important activity that supports winning without fighting.

On behalf of the CA Capability Manager, Col. (Ret.) Cahill reported on several areas:

- The CA Capability Manager is working closely with several partner organizations to ensure current and future CA capabilities are properly captured in key policy documents and initiatives within the Department of Defense and USSOCOM.
- The CA Capability Manager is also integrating CA capabilities—including ideas for the execution of governance and stabilization—into the Army Operating Concept 2040 and the supporting documents of the new Army Concept Framework. These documents feed Army experimentation and future force designs.
- The Civil Affairs Science and Technology Learning Environment (CASTLE) Initiative continues to make progress in documenting a process that leverages applied social, data, and learning sciences to address the social, political, economic, and cultural factors that
influence populations through information dominance in great power competition, multidomain operations, and irregular warfare. The Initiative made great strides by observing the 97th CA Bn (SO)(A)’s CKI process during Project Convergence 22 in October, working closely with members of the Office of Analytics at the State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).

- In the area of Warfighters and other exercises, the Capability Manager is supporting the Operations Group at Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) and USACAPOC(A) to combine the Civil Affairs Brigade Command Post Exercise-Functional (CPX-F) with Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 23-4 this year. This should provide an excellent opportunity to exercise a brigade-level Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF) with subordinate CA battalions working in the Corps and Division Rear. Elements of the 95th CA Bde (SO)(A) are also participating in the WFX, enabling the exercise of SOF-CF CA Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence (I3). Finally, a Table Top Exercise (TTX) led by the 95th CA Bde (SO)(A) in May will bring in elements of USACAPOC(A) and multiple U.S. Government agencies, providing the opportunity to exercise Civil-Military Integration at several levels.

Dr. Dale Walsh completed the CA Command Manager portion with the USAR CA Force Design Update that creates structure to align new CA core competencies and Army 2030/2040 objectives. Maj. (Ret.) Alfonso G. DeVeyra III, of the Civil Affairs Proponent’s Doctrine Development Division at USAFKSWCS updated the CA Branch Proponent task organization led by Lt. Col. Salvatore Candela. He showed how doctrinal products developed by the branch proponent are embedded and nested with strategic, operational, and tactical policy and doctrine, starting with the National Security Strategy and including the new Army FM 3-0, Operations. He provided the current status of several doctrinal CA publications, then discussed the following initiatives for FY23:

- Next April, the CA Doctrine Development Division will request feedback from the operational force and combat training centers on the value and utility of FM 3-57.
- The Division will work with PKSOI and the Army’s Mission Command Center of Excellence on Army and Joint Doctrine for Military Government to close a critical knowledge gap in the uniformed services for shaping during competition and consolidation of gains.
- CA doctrine writers will support the Army’s Campaign of Learning by observing CA forces in training events throughout the year and documenting the execution of the new mission essential tasks defined in FM 3-57 and related Army Technical Publications (ATPs).
- The Division will be working with the Army University Press and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth to develop audio and video products to supplement the existing written doctrinal publications for the continued education of the force.

Col. Jay Liddick, Director PKSOI, followed with an update on the key efforts of the Institute to “Shape, but Deliver.” Since the CA Roundtable, PKSOI has led or contributed to the recent update and publication of JP 3-07, Stabilization, FM 3-0, Operations, and the new NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.28, Stabilization as well as the development of the new Army Operating Concept by the Army Futures Command’s Futures and Concepts Center.
The Institute continues to expand, develop, and institutionalize the Joint Interagency Stabilization Course (JIASC) for planning stabilization at the operational and tactical levels and recently developed the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Framework as a tool for stabilization practitioners. The Institute is playing a supporting role in executing the tenets of the Global Fragility Act (GFA) and, as the Army’s office of primary responsibility (OPR) for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Protection of Civilians, is supporting the development of WPS strategy and the implementation of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP).

The Institute is also supporting U.S. European Command activities related to operations in Ukraine, assisting in the training of Army Security Force Assistance units at Fort Bragg, and supporting multiple efforts and initiatives of the CA Capability Manager and the CA Branch proponent. Finally, the Institute continues to support key Joint and Army Exercises within resource and time constraints and is developing a “Big Event” to replace two legacy events it once held pre-COVID – the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) held in the spring and the strategic seminars held in the fall.

Among the international organizations with which PKSOI maintains close ties are NATO’s CCoE, and the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations. CA personnel are ideal candidates for the Army’s U.S. Military Observer Group, from which about 40 uniformed U.S. personnel are deployed every six months to be part of UN peace operations mission. CA Soldiers who participated in this mission gained vast situational awareness and understanding of international security operations as well as partner nations and militaries. It also helps build a unique global civil-military network to leverage for competition in integrated deterrence.

Mr. Anthony A. Weiss of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Office of the Deputy Commandant for Information (DCI) explained USMC CA force updates based on its integration with Operations in the Information Environment (OIE). He overviewed the DCI’s Information Maneuver Division (IMD) that oversees USMC CA and reported the recently published Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP)-8, Information, identifying Information Advantage as composed of three elements: Systems Overmatch, Prevailing Narrative, and Force Resiliency. He explained how CA operates in all three areas, contributing to an Information Advantage for the commander. MCDP-8 defines a 21st century combined arms model consisting of information maneuver and information fires. IMD is collaborating with the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) to update Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, for civil affairs operations and CA planning, to be published by May of 2023.

With respect to USMC CA force design and personnel, USMC CA operational capability remains at three reserve CA Groups (CAGs). Still, a smaller CA planning capability resides across the USMC, even though it gained CA elements at the new Marine Littoral Regiments. Additionally, in an effort for professionalization, the Marine Corps recently created the 17XX Information Maneuver Occupational Field. The 17XX integrates the new active component 1707 Influence Officer and 1751 Influence Specialists MOSs, which require CA, PSYOP, and OIE qualification/training.
Lt. Col. Stefan Muehlich, Chief of Concepts, Interoperability, Capabilities at the CCoE in Den Haag, joined the Symposium from Berlin, Germany. He started by describing the new NATO definition of “Civil-Military Cooperation – CIMIC” and explaining how CIMIC is considered with maneuver, fires, and information as functions that take actions to create effects in NATO’s Joint Function Framework. However, with the new definition and the development of the analysis and assessment capability, CIMIC also clearly has an informing and directing role more akin to intelligence and command and control.

He then described the newly defined term, Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), with civil-military liaison as its most sophisticated form. NATO’s eight cross-cutting topics (Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), Protection of Civilians (PoC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Countering the Trafficking of Human Beings (C-THB), and Building Integrity (BI)—are now included in the capstone doctrine Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01, Allied Joint Doctrine, which has recently been ratified and is about to be endorsed.

Another development is the dynamics of Human Security in Operations (HSIO), an umbrella term for Cross Cutting Topics and a major topic at the Madrid NATO Summit last summer. In addition, PoC was put under the spotlight in two high-profile actions, the U.S. Department of Defense’s publication of the CHMR-AP in August and NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Directive 086-066 in September that reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to PoC. Lt. Col. Muehlich highlighted the new CCoE Study Paper that compares, contrasts, and critiques these papers and their relation to CA and CIMIC. Since July 2021, the 7th Army Training Command in Germany, has posted a U.S. CA Liaison Officer at the CCoE, with the intent of extending it another year while continuing work to make the U.S. a sponsoring nation with a permanent presence at the CCoE.

The 30-minute question-and-answer period that followed the presentations expanded on several workshop panel member discussion points and demonstrated the field’s great interest in the future of Civil Affairs. This discussion can be viewed on the Eunomia Journal YouTube channel.

**Workshop II – Civil Affairs: Shaping in a Competitive Environment**

The workshop after lunch on Day 1 featured Maj. Gen. Isaac Johnson, Jr., Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or USACAPOC(A). Col. Jason Arndt, who directs USACAPOC(A)’s Strategic Initiatives Group facilitated the workshop, in which Maj. Gen. Johnson shared his views of how Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) can shape the environment during the competition phase of conflict, in order to achieve enduring advantages. The advantages CAO provides, combined with other shaping operations, creates integrated deterrence, and prevents competition with adversaries from slipping into crisis or conflict. Maj. Gen. Johnson highlighted three USACAPOC(A) initiatives vital to transformation of USACAPOC(A) to more an information force than an information-related capability. First, he discussed the Army’s emerging Information Advantage (IA) concept. Second, he stressed his focus on customer service. Lastly, he highlighted the changes to the 38G military government specialist program.
Civil affairs forces are well-postured to adopt emerging IA concepts, primarily for two reasons. First, CA forces conducted several rounds of innovation during FY22 exercises, allowing better understanding of the core functions of IA and their application within the framework of USACAPOC(A) capabilities. Second, a CA force design update has been submitted, which provides the greater mix of specialties needed to completely perform core functions as envisioned by the IA concept. Another command priority Maj. Gen. Johnson discussed is an increased focus on customer service. His strategy of outreach and engagement with GCCs and Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) seeks to better understand the unique problem sets within the individual theaters. The shift in focus will also minimize ad-hoc force requests that don't fully employ unit capabilities. Additionally, the Regionally-Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, or ReARMM, will provide a predictable force package each FY that is ready to deploy in support of our customers during competition.

As he noted at the Annual Meeting in October, his command emphasis is on an active sense of CA readiness for strategic competition to help USACAPOC(A)’s primary “customers”—geographic and service component commands—gain and maintain informational and other positional advantages vital to “winning without fighting” across the whole of the competition continuum. This especially includes providing unique and pivotal capabilities such as 38G military government specialists. The CG echoed USACAPOC(A) Cultural Programs Officer Col. Scott DeJesse’s observation at the Annual Meeting that “Civil Affairs helps commanders deal with the complexity of the civilian world” by creating access, influence, and corresponding capacities through the networks they build. Properly trained and engaged in the regions, CA forces in general, and 38G personnel in particular, can help provide strategic warning in identifying civil threats to the strategic and operational environment, explaining the linkages, for example, between political and socioeconomic instability and national and international security concerns in those regions.

In order to mitigate the past experience of deployed CA forces in non-doctrinal “Frankenstein units,” Maj. Gen. Johnson, upon taking command this year, immediately placed greater priority on the geographic and cultural realignment of CA commands (CACOMs) with other regionally aligned Army commands (including Security Force Assistance Brigades) and much more robust partnering with universities, partly to tap into their scientific knowledge and data for operations as well as to find new CA recruits for especially the 38G program.

The last point the CG made regarding Civil Affairs capability to shape competition and win without fighting involved the 38G military governance specialist program. As the program has matured, USACAPOC(A) is recruiting significantly more candidates for the program. The last panel considered almost 150 candidates and selected 74. These specialists allow CA units to contribute with PhD-level subject matter expertise to whole-of-government efforts to strengthen allies and partners. This engagement and integration, before crisis or conflict, builds strong relationships and networks which creates an enduring advantage for the U.S.
In addition to his thoughts on winning without fighting, MG Johnson shared news about Operation Toy Drop 2.0. This event will increase interoperability and readiness of airborne units within the command. In response to audience questions, he described his command philosophy, which relies on a balance between unit training and individual Soldier readiness. While he does not want to chase metrics, he expects leaders to take care of their Soldiers. He also described the benefits and advantages for USACAPOC(A) when leaders shift their focus to a customer-oriented mindset.

In response to another question, he recognized the challenges while noting the greater advantages inherent to being a Citizen-Soldier, juggling competing priorities, and dealing with complexity. Given how this is at the core of CA professional capacity, he stressed that there are opportunities for reserve component Soldiers to participate in advanced training courses and highlighted the need for individual self-development. Lastly, Maj. Gen. Johnson emphasized the many advantages of leveling the core CA curriculum between both active SOF and conventional reserve component CA generalists and the CA Corps in general, as Brig. Gen. Beaurpere noted in his presentation.

Among Maj. Gen. Johnson's remarks was his reiteration of his support for a more open relationship between USACAPOC(A) and the Civil Affairs Association. He extolled the many benefits the Association provides to both his command and its personnel on CA force and professional development as well as education and advocacy, the scholarship program, etc. He thanked the Association, for example, for providing the unique online convening platforms such as at the Symposium to communicate widely and simultaneously to a large swath of his command trace. He also noted how its awards program helps improve CA Corps identity and esprit de corps.

**Workshop III – Civil Affairs Industrial Base: Wargaming Civil Affairs**

How might Civil Affairs forces wargame and simulate the wide range of operations they perform across the globe? Col. Arnel P. David brought together Dr. Benjamin Jensen from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Dr. Thomas Nagle from Strategy Connections to address this question. Dr. Jensen is a Reserve Military Intelligence officer and Dr. Nagle retired as an Army Strategist. This annual workshop, which Col. David leads as a CA Association vice president, contributes to a wider effort to create an industrial base utilizing social sciences and information technologies for Civil Affairs force development.

Dr. Jensen opened with a review of a number of interesting gaming initiatives he is leading at CSIS and at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As a professor at the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), he experimented with a variety of wargaming techniques, and some led to invitations to human security crisis gaming events in West Africa. These series of games collected data and worked with civil society organizations to help predict instability and alert of human security challenges. Dr. Jensen pointed out that “games become a synthetic environment in which you can try to replicate decision-making under uncertainty and the inherent trade-offs people have to make...expected utility and risk propensity.” He emphasized less is more and to focus on quality.
Discussing his strategic gaming platform, War Paths, Dr. Nagle reviewed why you might wargame CA operations. He made four key points:

1. Strategic arguments bring about cause and effect discussions.
2. It forces you to think through tertiary effects (2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} order effects).
3. Games bring about more rigor which cause you to defend your assertions with justifications.
4. Wargaming CA operations may bring in opposing viewpoints to challenge your perspective.

His tool, War Paths, was used at a variety of levels, from operational to strategic and with diplomatic, grey zone, and special warfare operations. Col. David highlighted their use in the United Kingdom where the Secretary of State for Defence and his policy advisor participated in a large strategic-level matrix game. He went on to urge that this topic is important because “most of us professionals have an ethical obligation, whether you are in the military or are civilian, to think about how our operations and activities affect populations and other political entities.”

A rich discussion followed the presentations. In response to a question on how to integrate more of these types of games with low cost in time and other resources, Dr. Jensen offered that there are methods and tools that enable games that can be done in 30 minutes. There was a general sense toward the end of the discussion of a fear that the shift to great power competition will cause many organizations to ignore the hard lessons learned with stability operations and the counterinsurgency campaigns that have dominated the past two decades. The CA Corps needs to help retain this knowledge but also continue to use games to study and learn about these human phenomena further. If the CA force wants to hone its craft further, games can help.

No doubt the Proponent’s emerging Civil Affairs Science and Technology Learning Ecosystem (CASTLE) initiative should vigorously include wargaming and related experimentation, including interagency and interorganizational partners, to build both the capacities and capabilities the CA Corps will require to win without fighting.

Look for more discussion of related science and technology issues like this in the online Eunomia Journal and OneCA podcasts in the coming months.

**Workshop IV – Interagency Perspectives on National Security and the Role of Civil Affairs**

Day 2 of the Symposium opened with the interagency workshop to explore the role of the civil affairs community in the context of the new National Security Strategy, or NSS, closely followed by the National Defense Strategy, or NDS. Panelists included Mr. Paul Fritch, senior advisor to the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Mr. Aaron Roesch, acting deputy director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Policy in the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning; and Major Jeffrey Chase, a U.S. Army civil affairs officer and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Liaison Officer to USAID. CA Association director Ryan McCannell, who is also a USAID Advisor to the Pentagon, moderated the session.
The NSS states the overall goal of the United States is for “a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order.” This capstone strategic document balances competition with the People’s Republic of China as the “pacing challenge” for the United States, and the near-term threat of Russian aggression, against the need for international cooperation on a range of transnational threats: climate change, global health, food insecurity, and countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism. The NDS dives more deeply into the competition problem set, introducing a new concept of “integrated deterrence,” which accompanies campaigning and building enduring advantages as the three main lines of effort for the Department of Defense (DoD). As noted by Mr. Fritch, the two documents’ nuanced distinctions stem from their different scopes: the NSS is government-wide, whereas NDS is the SecDef’s document, designed to guide civilian policy makers in the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, the armed services, and combatant commands in how to allocate their resources and operationalize the NSS within the Defense community. The NSS implies that improved integration among agencies is necessary for both competition and transnational cooperation. In contrast, the NDS definition of integrated deterrence centers around streamlining DoD's own vast array of stakeholders to counter a discrete range of threats.

Mr. Roesch noted that USAID collaborates with DoS on a joint strategic framework, and in USAID’s case, an agency-level policy framework that articulates how development assistance can contribute to the overall objectives of the NSS. These core documents link the NSS with the integrated country strategies and country development cooperation strategies developed by embassies and aid missions, ideally with inputs from Civil Affairs personnel attached to various posts or combatant commands. USAID also maintains a cadre of civil-military coordinators based at the Pentagon, GCCs, and a few TSOCs to improve defense-development coordination.

Maj. Chase plays a similar role in reverse, serving as a military liaison at USAID headquarters. He described how USSOUTHCOM’s overall goal is to build and strengthen ties with allies, interorganizational partners, and interagency partners at the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government entities. As a GCC with no assigned forces, USSOUTHCOM places a high value on such partnerships, not only to compete with rivals and adversaries, but also to coordinate on things like migration, climate change, democratic backsliding, and security challenges.

The lively question-and-answer period featured an exploration of the nuances around “integrated deterrence” and perceived differences in the orientation of the NSS and NDS. For Civil Affairs, the growing cadre of 38G and 38S personnel can play a useful role in integrated deterrence to the extent that they understand what civilian agencies may already be doing in the governance space.

Both panelists and audience members expressed concern that a fixation on competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could crowd out other strategic imperatives and oversimplify the range of challenges policymakers and implementers face in various country contexts. The war on terror highlighted the dangers of focusing on one problem set to the detriment of other challenges like conflict prevention and stabilization. Likewise, a counter-PRC obsession risks alienating allies and partners that cannot afford an either/or choice between the PRC and the West.
As the warrior-diplomats of the Joint Force, Civil Affairs forces have a unique and important role to play in helping commanders and chiefs-of-mission navigate these strategic considerations. In that respect, the interagency panel aligned well with other roundtable sessions and this year’s papers, since the NSS and NDS both reinforce an approach based on “winning without fighting.”

**Workshop V – Allied and Multinational Civil-Military Approaches to Winning without Fighting**

Moving from the interagency to the international level, Association vice president Col. (Ret.) Christopher Holshek led a discussion of how allied and multinational civil-military partners may win without fighting. Participants were: Col. Stephanie Tutton, United Nations Office of Military Affairs; Dominique Gassauer, Civil-Military Coordination Section, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); Lt. Col. Stefan Muehlich, CCoE Branch Chief, Concepts Interoperability Capabilities; Lt. Col. Dave Allen, former U.K. Army Land Warfare Center Irregular Warfare/Engagement Doctrine; and Canadian Maj. Stuart Thomas, Deputy Chief of Information Operations, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Col. (Ret.) Holshek began by pointing out how both NATO and U.S. policies are in an environment of strategic competition, hybrid warfare, and complex, multidimensional peace operations. They call for a greater employment of “military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing” per the [NATO 2022 Strategic Concept](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_114578.htm). A critical component of American integrated deterrence, as depicted in the new [National Security Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-strategy/), is “integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches.” Nowhere, in fact, does “winning without fighting” find greatest positional advantage for the United States and its allies and partners than in the global civil-military network gained and maintained through the interallied and interorganizational system that the world’s leading democracies have cultivated for generations. It is enabling the U.S. and NATO, for example, to play a decisive stand-off role in thwarting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and countering Chinese regional strategy.

Col. Tutton opened the United Nations discussion by reviewing how [UN](https://www.un.org) civil-military coordination is central to the integrated mission process, in which the military staff U-9 (UN-CIMIC) facilitates the interface between the military, police, and civilian components of UN field missions at the operational level at the mission headquarters. This civil-military network includes various UN and non-UN humanitarian and development partners, local authorities, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations, host national government, and civil-society organizations. UN-CIMIC, as a military staff function, contributes to winning the peace mainly through the UN-CIMIC analysis/estimate (CIV-OES) process. CIV-OES is the structured examination of all relevant civilian organizations’ operational information in order to develop and share knowledge and support a shared understanding of the civilian dimension of the mission operational environment as well as to minimize adverse civil-military impacts.
Given how climate change is driving larger and more frequent internationally coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief situations, Ms. Gassauer provided a lengthy primer on the UN’s humanitarian civil-military coordination approach (UN CMCoord) and internationally recognized standards for humanitarian civil-military coordination. As the facilitator noted in his remarks, CA professionals must become more familiar with the frameworks in order to gain and maintain greater access and influence and the positional advantages that come with it.

At the same time, the “winning” part of “winning without fighting” in UN contexts has different motivation. In UN peace operations, this is sustainable, civilian-led peace and its political accommodation in affected civil societies. In especially multinational environments, CA professionals must understand and appreciate the exceptional sensitivities of military involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that UN CMCoord navigates. Driven by anything but a power dynamic, it is defined as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.” Rather than political gain, humanitarian response is premised on the adherence of all participants to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence. Observance of these principles is critical for humanitarian actors to gain acceptance and access for relief operations, especially in situations of armed conflict.

The key elements of UN CMCoord are information sharing, task division, and planning. Its main tasks are to: establish and sustain dialogue with military forces and exchange information with them; assist in negotiating issues in critical areas of humanitarian civil-military coordination; support development and dissemination of country/context-specific guidelines; and observe activities to ensure distinction between humanitarian action and activities prioritizing security. Indirect rather than direct military humanitarian assistance has been found most preferrable and effective, especially with respect to avoiding dependence on these forces for more than security. Common areas of appropriate military support to civilian humanitarian actors include: civil sector analysis (including damage assessments, etc.); opening and safeguarding lines of communication and supply on land, air, and sea; and the use of military assets to support humanitarian assessments and actions in hard-to-reach areas. Direct military humanitarian assistance actions in multinational settings are tempered by the “last resort” and “do no harm” principles found in the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief. More information can also be found in OCHA’s 2018 UN-CMCoord Field Handbook 2.0.

Lt. Col. Muehlich followed with a deeper doctrinal discussion from Workshop I on the evolution of NATO CMI (civil-military integration) and CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) under the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC). In an information-intensive, people-centric competition continuum contextualized by the Comprehensive Approach, “winning without fighting” is strategic shaping (rather than contesting or fighting) where the Alliance constantly looks to set more favorable conditions through a combination of diplomatic, information, military, economic elements of power. This comes through influencing and changing the behavior of potential
adversaries and/or engaging with and supporting partners facing security challenges. To succeed in such a context, NATO militaries must develop and integrate military power to fulfill Warfare Development Imperatives along the lines of: influence and power projection; layered resilience (including civilian resilience); cognitive superiority (under the cognitive warfare concept); integrated multi-domain defense; and, cross-domain command.

CMI is “a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, mutually increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crisis.” CIMIC, in turn, is “a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.” Civil-military liaison, support to the force, and support to non-military actors and the civil environment are its core functions. While CIMIC is the military capability that enables CMI, both enable the Comprehensive Approach with whole-of-government and whole-of-society efforts to enable layered resilience. The careful synchronization of military and non-military efforts is key. CIMIC, as a joint function, looks to fully integrate all elements of power at all levels in cross-domain convergence, cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence, enabling commands to understand, shape, and exploit the operational environment.

In the meantime, CA-CIMIC synchronization remains an important topic to the CCOE, with even greater impetus in NATO rear areas in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe in coordination with NATO assistance to member states tangential to Ukraine.

With the new Ministry of Defence (MoD) Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British policy and national strategy under the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) takes an integrated approach similar to U.S. integrated deterrence or the NATO Comprehensive Approach. “Integrated Action,” Lt. Col. Allen explained, is the “audience-centric orchestration of military activities, across all operational domains, synchronised with non-military activities to influence the attitude and behaviour of selected audiences necessary to achieve successful outcomes.” However, although civil-military networks are essential to enabling comprehensive integrated action and civil-military outreach forces are seen as information forces, human security is increasingly fundamental to the British strategic sense of wider security as well as operational focus. MoD Joint Service Publication 985, Human Security in Defence, describes several human security considerations that, if ignored or compromised, are drivers of instability. Paramount to this understanding of human security is the principle of legitimacy.

In addition to an essential requirement with respect to the use of force, human security is essential to a compelling narrative to maintain U.K., its allies, and partner force legitimacy and campaign authority. JSP 985 adopts the human security model along the lines of cross-cutting themes. This includes: the protection of civilians; women, peace, and security; conflict related sexual violence; modern slavery and human trafficking; preventing and countering violent extremism; children
affected by armed conflict; building integrity and countering corruption; and cultural property protection. Integrated Action and the human security operational theme play large in British security force assistance in Ukraine, from where the MoD, in turn, is drawing important lessons on the applicability of these concepts to modern warfare.

As noted at the Annual Meeting, CA interoperability with CIMIC forces has been gaining traction, especially since the war in Ukraine broke out. As briefed at the Annual Meeting, the 353rd Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) is working more closely with NATO CIMIC partners and ramping up its engagement in Europe for numerous reasons, among them compensating for the gaps created by the disbanding of the Europe-resident 361st CA Brigade, which will complete its stand-down in 2023. This will ensure continued CA involvement in important NATO exercises such as Atlantic Resolve as well as form an important part of U.S. support to the European Defense Initiative. The 353rd CACOM is also providing CA forces in support of the newly reestablished U.S. Army V Corps, operating out of Poznan, Poland. This includes CA support to NATO CIMIC assistance to civil-military coordination of refugee relief efforts in Poland.

Against this backdrop, Maj. Thomas, at the recommendation of the Canadian Army’s Influence Activities Task Force (IATF), provided a fascinating briefing on Canadian support to multinational CA-CIMIC cooperation through Task Force Poland—Maj. Thomas’s duty assignment prior to his deployment to MINUSMA. Poland hosts over two million Ukrainian refugees—the majority of the more than three and a half million Ukrainians that fled to neighboring countries. Centered in the Warsaw area, the TF Poland effort includes continuous liaison with Polish government, military, and police authorities, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and other UN agencies in-country and the European Union Humanitarian Hub, as well as numerous NGOs. CIMIC tasks include: coordinating with these organizations to enhance common operating picture and identify NATO military assistance opportunities; conducting area civil assessments and civil information management; conducting CIMIC planning and integration; and conducting civil engagement.

With respect to the first three tasks, Maj. Thomas noted the effectiveness of the U.S. CA personnel at the Multi-National Civil-Military Operations and Coordination Center. The Canadian team has been especially active in providing linguist support, chaplains for spiritual and informed trauma care to Ukrainian Refugees at the reception centers, primary medical care support at the clinics at the reception centers, and movie nights and day care assistance to help refugee families find normality in their current situation. Additional tasks have included, for example, preparation, production, and distribution of Soldier information cards and facilitating translator support.

Maj. Thomas then took advantage of reporting from his current duty station in Bamako, Mali, to reinforce the earlier observations on the importance of understanding UN as well as NATO frameworks in multinational civil-military settings. He emphasized the mutual values-added of having NATO civil-military officers at UN field missions to enhance civil-military operations by conducting tasks such as civil information management, key leader engagement, and UN-CIMIC operational assessments and integration.
**Workshop VI – U.S. Marine Corps Fusion of Civil Affairs and Information**

Moderated by Mr. James Jabinal from the Office of Information Operations Policy under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), the panel consisted of Lt. Col. Jeremiah Root (1707 Influence Officer) from the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, Maj. Drake Toney (0530 Civil Affairs Officer) from the Force Headquarters Group, and Maj. Brad Hampton (1707 Influence Officer) who is the USMC representative to the Principal Information Operations Advisor Cross-Functional Team.

The discussion started with general thoughts on CA and PSYOP forces, the newly established USMC Influence MOSs, and how CA can contribute to Information as a Joint function. The 1707 Influence Officer and 1751 Influence Specialist are only applicable to the active component and require completing the Marine Corps Civil Affairs Course, the PSYOP Qualification Course, and a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) course.

The panelists provided great insight into how CA should be integrated with OIE for competition and influence. Not only is influence in the *National Security Strategy*, it is in the joint definition for Civil-Military Operations... “the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support U.S. objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.”

Integral to the conversation were feedback on how the USMC Reserve Civil Affairs Groups can integrate with OIE broadly and the future relationship between the Influence Marines and reserve component CA Marines. The information environment is rapidly evolving and it will be interesting to see what the Marine Corps contributes to OIE.

**Civil Affairs Issue Papers**

Closing out the Symposium, the authors of the five *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* selected to appear in this year’s volume presented and, through audience vote, competed for cash prizes of $1,000 for first, $500 for second, and $250 for third. The winners were the first three of these papers:

- “The Power of the People: Civil Affairs and Civil Resistance” by Captain Daniel Moriarty
- “Reclaiming Civil Affairs as a Strategic Asset: Identifying ‘Deep Expertise’ for the Benefit of the Army” by Lieutenant Colonel JohnPaul LeCedre
- “Civil-Military Operations in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” by Major Tony Smith
- “Refining the Civil Affairs Value Proposition: Governance in the Modern Operation Environment,” by Captain John Wirges
- “Social Sciences Contribution to Civil Affairs,” by Captain John McLaughlin (who was unable to present his paper).

Issue Paper Committee Chairman retired Brig. Gen. Bruce Bingham noted that, as the Army and Marines face changes in strategic focus, equipment in advancing technology, and even different
influences on Soldier training and behavior, “having our forum for discussing the Civil Affairs role in all this is more critical than ever.” In the finest tradition of Civil Affairs, he challenged CA NCO’s, company and young field grade officers, “as well as the sage colonels” to put their knowledge to broader use through the annual Issue Papers challenge. “As the safety slogan says: If you see something, say something. Please share your experience and ideas with the Civil Affairs Corps, the Army and Marine Corps, and of course our allies and partners worldwide.”

The papers will be published, along with the final Symposium Report, in the ninth volume of the Civil Affairs Issue Papers, in early 2023. Authors will also discuss them more on the OneCA podcast. Previous volumes of the Civil Affairs Issue Papers and summaries of the current papers are also available on the Association website.

**Final Remarks**

Association President Col. (Ret.) Joe Kirlin closed out the two-day forum by thanking the CA community, its allies from around the world, and its organizational partners for their robust participation and partnership in helping the Association grow its resources as well as expand its convening role in interorganizational collaboration in order to promote a worldwide enterprise of civil-military enterprises. He also noted how Association platforms like the Issue Papers, Symposium, Roundtable, OneCA podcasts, Eunomia Journal, etc., continue to validate the enduring applicability of timeless CA Corps themes—how, as Lt. Gen Brunson put it at the Annual Meeting, “no military operation can be divorced from civil considerations;” the need to “secure the victory” in all environments, settings, and operations; and, how enterprises like CA have always been about “winning without fighting.” “For us, it’s always back to the future,” he noted.

As outgoing president, Col. (Ret.) Kirlin sees a great future for the worldwide civil-military enterprise—which, he noted, has always been about “winning without fighting”—given the greater openness of CA-related institutions like the proponent, USACAPOC(A), PKSOI, the JSOU and others to work closely on educating, advocating, and motivating the CA Corps as well as the greater cooperation between the Corps, the Association, and CIMIC allies and interorganizational partners.

Copies of the paper summaries, Symposium presentations, referenced documents, etc., are available for Association members in the “2022 Symposium” folder (under “Events”) in the Research Library (under “Resources”) on the Association website. Meanwhile, the entire Symposium discussion is available to watch on the Eunomia Journal YouTube channel.

The final version of this Report will appear in the 2022-23 Civil Affairs Issue Papers (Vol. 9), out in late February or early March in online and print formats. The next event, the online CA Roundtable, will be in early April 2023—date to be announced soon.

For more information, go to the Civil Affairs Association website and remember to subscribe or update your member profile.